beliefs about a moral subject matter. For the most part, I will use the terms 'judgment' and 'belief' interchangeably.
I argue that distinguishing moral intuitions and moral beliefs this way gives us an appropriately nuanced picture of moral motivation. Roughly speaking, my claim is that internalism is true about intuitions and externalism is true about beliefs or judgments. Moral intuitions, being constituted by emotions of a certain kind, are in themselves defeasibly motivating, and can move us to act even against our explicit beliefs. Moral beliefs, in turn, are associated with motivation in a number of different ways. Some beliefs non-accidentally coincide with motivation, since belief and motivation have a common cause in sentimental experience. Other beliefs motivate rational agents, because they implicitly attribute to an action a property that engages a rational agent's motivation. However, even if this kind of rationalist internalism is true of fully competent users of normative concepts, it need not hold for minimally competent moral thinkers. I thus leave open the possibility of having moral beliefs that do not tacitly amount to beliefs about some property that engages a rational agent's motivation. Such opaque moral beliefs will only motivate those who desire to do what is right de dicto. This means that a kind of externalism is true about moral judgments, and that morality is practical in many different ways. I label this view Disjunctivism About Moral Motivation.
Disjunctivism leaves conceptual room for many different kinds of amoralists, people who fail to be motivated in line with their judgments. But can it account for the reliable connection between beliefs and motivation in moralists -those who are not amoralistswithout artificial psychological redescription or making morality into a fetish? I argue that distinguishing between different external connections between belief and motivation helps defuse Michael Smith's well-known charges against externalism. There are three different ways in which changes in motivation can reliably track changes in judgment: as a result of common cause of belief and motivation in the case of intuition-driven change, as a result of rational disposition in the case of rationalizing moral beliefs, or as a result of a conscientious desire in the case of opaque moral belief. No theory-driven redescription is needed, and only the sort of de dicto desire based explanation that Smith himself considers is plausibly fetishistic (but externalists have no need to consider morally perfect agents as being so motivated).
In the final section, I note that the Moral Thought Pluralist account captures what is attractive about sentimentalist moral psychology without the need for any special moral semantics, since according to it, moral language expresses ordinary beliefs and only conversationally implicates the presence of motivation. Unlike some other forms of metaethical pluralism, it doesn't call for giving up the effort of finding universally applicable conceptual truths. Indeed, it provides not only an account of moral motivation, but also a plausible explanation of the persistence of the dispute between internalists and externalists.
Two Types of Moral Thought
When it comes to perception, the distinction between appearances and belief is widely accepted. It is most obvious in cases of known visual illusion, such as the Müller-Lyer is for most of us. Look at the two familiar lines in Figure 1 . Try as you might, unless you cover the heads or place a measure next to the lines, they will visually appear to be of different lengths. Yet you know they are not, so you don't believe so. You reject the appearance -it is, for you, a mere appearance. An appearance is thus not itself a belief -it is non-doxastic. Nor is it under direct voluntary control or the result of reasoning or inference from beliefs -in short, it's spontaneous. Yet the visual experience by itself attracts you to believe that the lines are of a different length. It seems to present to you the way things are independently of you. It is only because of other things you know that you don't take the appearance at face value. In short, it's compelling. Indeed, if you didn't know those other things, you'd arguably have perceptual justification for believing that the length is different (Pryor 2000 ).
An appearance or seeming is thus a non-doxastic, spontaneous, and compelling propositionally contentful state that shares the mind-to-world direction of fit with belief and putatively non-inferentially justifies belief. Many philosophers have recently argued that there are also quasi-perceptual appearances whose nature and epistemic role is importantly similar to perceptual appearances.
1 Consider the proposition that if S knows that p, it's not an accident that S believes that p. If you merely think about it and reflect on it, perhaps imagining a Gettier-like case to clarify the content of the proposition to yourself, it will probably seem to you that the proposition is true. The truth of the proposition is compellingly presented to you in the experience, which attracts you to believe it. Such appearance isn't based on inference from what you believe or a theory you hold, so it can serve as a data point for competing theories to accommodate. Again like a perceptual appearance, a quasi-perceptual appearance can be misleading. For example, all the premises of a paradox seem true, even if one knows that at least one must be false (Sosa 2007 So let's think about Hiroshima. Bearing in mind the reasoning that Truman took to justify the bombing, consider some of the effects of the thermal flash, blast wave, and the ensuing fire on people within several miles of the epicentre, as described by survivors:
A woman with her jaw missing and her tongue hanging out of her mouth was wandering around the area of Shinsho-machi in the heavy, black rain. (…) There were some who were burned black and died, and there were others with huge burns who died with their skins bursting, and some others who died all stuck full of broken glass. (…) I saw fire reservoirs filled to the brim with dead people who looked as though they had been boiled alive. (…) Men whose whole bodies were covered with blood, and women whose skin hung from them like a kimono, plunged shrieking into the river (…) I came onto I don't know how many, burned from the hips up; and where the skin had peeled, their flesh was wet and mushy. . . . And they had no faces! Their eyes, noses and mouths had been burned away, and it looked like their ears had melted off. How does constitution by manifestations of moral sentiments account for the core features of moral appearances? To begin with, emotions plausibly constitute appearances.
They present their target as having a property, sometimes called the formal object of the emotion: fear presents its target as dangerous. When it is a manifestation of a moral sentiment, anger presents its target as morally blameworthy. This presentational component of an emotion isn't a belief or judgment. Famously, one can fear getting on a plane while believing that it is perfectly safe. Someone who has this combination of emotion and belief may be irrational -the appearance involved in the emotion conflicts with the belief -but not in the same way as someone who holds contradictory beliefs. So emotional appearances are non-doxastic. My own view is that an emotion has its intentional content, and thus conditions of accuracy, in virtue of its very feel or phenomenal character (Kauppinen forthcoming a). Third, emotional appearances are also spontaneous -not necessarily in the sense that they arise quickly, but in that they are not under direct voluntary control, and that they are not the conclusions of inference. It may be that you can't help being awed by a rival when viewing her actions from the common point of view. It may, to be sure, take a lot of reflection to get in the position to feel something from the common point of view (which is another reason not to confuse moral intuitions with gut reactions). Fourth, emotional manifestations of moral sentiments, especially when felt from the common point of view, are compelling. It seems to us that the very wrongness or admirableness of an action is given to us in the experience, and we're attracted to believe correspondingly, even if it goes against our prior theory.
Finally, the rich and diverse phenomenology and motivational force of moral intuitions is readily accounted for if they consist in manifestations of moral sentiments. As
Adam Smith emphasized, we should indeed talk about moral sentiments in the plural.
Impartial resentment feels different and motivates differently from impersonally sympathetic suffering. The intuition that I've done something depraved might consist in self-directed contempt or disgust, while the intuition that I've behaved unjustly may be just resentment directed at myself.
So if moral intuitions are constituted by manifestations of moral sentiments, their core features and two directions of fit are readily explained. In a slogan, for something to seem wrong is for it to feel wrong. There are, of course, worries about intuitive sentimentalism as well. One obvious objection is that intuitions often taken to be intellectual quasi-perceptual appearances, not emotional ones. My response is that these quasiperceptual appearances are, in the relevant sense, intellectual: they result from merely thinking about the proposition, which may involve reflecting on what would be involved in its being true. They're not perceptual (I regard talk of a 'moral sense' as metaphorical), nor based on memory or introspection. It would be question-begging in favour of a priori intuitionism to restrict the relevant kind of thinking to mere understanding of the proposition. The second, related objection is that intuitions are supposed to play a justificatory role as well as an explanatory one. I argue elsewhere (Kauppinen forthcoming a) that sentimental appearances, in contrast to pseudo-intuitions like Jonathan Haidt's (2001) 'quick flashes of affect', do in fact defeasibly justify belief just as other quasi-perceptual or perceptual appearances do, and that sentiments felt from the common point of view avoid common defeaters.
The third common objection is that people can have intuitions without any distinctive phenomenological feel or motivational pull, for example when they consider a yet another trolley case. My response is that either the person has a what Hume called a 'calm passion' with a shallow phenomenology, and thus is after all in an emotional state that constitutes an intuition, or lacks an intuition but has an intuition-derived inclination to believe that I call an intuitive attraction. Suppose you resent using people as mere means. Sometimes when presented with a yet another trolley case that involves using someone as a mere means, the sentiment might manifest itself simply as an inclination to judge that the act is wrong. As long as this inclination is part of a pattern that does feature genuine emotions -in other cases of using someone as a mere means, you do or would get angry or feel guilt -it will still be the manifestation of a sentiment, and closely enough related to emotional intuitions to qualify as an intuitive attraction. So I conclude that there are two kinds of moral thought or opinion: straightforward beliefs and moral appearances or intuitions that are emotional manifestations of moral sentiments.
8 8 This view is not the only recent version of moral thought pluralism. According to Kriegel (2012) , there are two types of moral judgment: some are what Tamar Gendler calls aliefs, while others are beliefs. On Kriegel's picture, aliefs are products of System 1, and contain a mix of cognitive, conative, and affective states, while beliefs are products of System 2. (Kriegel's account implies that there are no perceptual beliefs, since perception is a System 1 process!) Aliefs, but not beliefs, are intrinsically motivating; as he says, "both cognitivism and internalism are true of moral judgment, but in different senses" (Kriegel 2012, 481 
Disjunctivism About Moral Motivation
In the previous section, I defended a version of the thesis I call Moral Thought Pluralism.
Here, I will explore the implications of Moral Thought Pluralism for moral motivation. Since the picture that emerges is that there are many separate paths to moral motivation, I'll call the view Disjunctivism About Moral Motivation, or Disjunctivism for short.
Let's assume the Humean theory of motivation is true, at least to the extent that beliefs alone don't motivate. This is a significant point in favour of externalism, since there is good reason to think that moral judgments are just beliefs about moral facts. After all, they behave just like beliefs with respect to evidence, degrees of certainty, and the like. 9 Also, the language that we use to express moral judgments functions just like the language used to express beliefs. If we just accept that moral judgments are beliefs, we spare ourselves the need for any expressivist contortions. A belief, I take it, is a propositional attitude with a mind-to-world direction of fit that involves a commitment to its content being the case. The kind of commitment that distinguishes belief from seeming is best cashed out in terms of its role in reasoning. If you believe that p, you proceed as if p, treating p as a premise in your reasoning. 10 You believe rather than hope or suppose that a bridge is strong enough to carry you over when you plan on that being the case. You may refuse to plan on it being the case even if it seems to you that the bridge is strong enough, although the seeming will make the belief attractive.
But what about the practicality of morality? Many who are otherwise sympathetic to cognitivism find it hard to accept that it is an accident of human nature that we are generally people have and others don't. So why is there a whiff of insincerity whenever someone says a behaviour is morally wrong and goes on to engage in it? Why does it seem to so many that it's not possible for a rational agent to remain entirely indifferent to her moral judgments?
On my view, this is explained by the fact that internalism is true of moral intuitions, and that moral beliefs are in several ways non-accidentally linked to motivation. I will begin with the relationship between moral intuitions and beliefs. As I've argued, moral intuitions defeasibly motivate, which is best accounted for by their being emotional manifestations of moral sentiments. Importantly, like other appearances, moral intuitions also attract us to assent to the corresponding proposition, to form the belief or judgment. Suppose I do form the belief that I ought to φ on the basis of the intuition that I ought to φ. Since the intuition both defeasibly motivates me to φ and attracts the belief that I ought to φ, my belief that I ought to φ is non-accidentally linked to defeasible motivation to φ -they have a common cause. Of course, on this view moral belief itself doesn't motivate. But it reliably co-occurs with motivation. It is nevertheless not pointless to form the belief, since it amounts to the kind of endorsement that makes a difference to further reasoning. If it merely appears to Huck Finn that slaves are worth respect, he may be motivated to treat them well, but will not assume the truth of the proposition in planning and theoretical reasoning.
This co-occurrence account comes tantalizingly close to some formulations of internalism. Here I am thinking in particular Jon Tresan's (2006 Tresan's ( , 2009 work defending what he calls de dicto or wide-scope internalism. The rough idea is that there is a difference between the wide-scope thesis that necessarily, if S judges that she morally ought to φ, she is at least somewhat motivated to φ, at least in C, and the narrow-scope thesis that if S judges that she morally ought to φ, she necessarily is at least somewhat motivated to φ, at least in C.
In the latter case, the judgment, the psychological state itself, constitutes or necessitates motivation, while in the former the concept of moral belief applies only to agents who are contents are such that they necessarily engage any rational agent's motivation. In fact, I
think that a third feature also makes a difference: just how good the subject's grasp of the relevant concepts is. I'll argue that subjects who are only minimally competent may have genuine moral beliefs without being rationally required to be motivated accordingly.
To see why this is so, let's begin with the cognitivist truism that a moral judgment is a belief that something has a moral property. It differs from other beliefs only in its content:
it represents its object as having a moral property. But what is it to attribute a moral property to something? One tempting way to answer this question is to begin with a metaphysical analysis of moral properties. Suppose that moral rationalists are correct, so that if S morally ought to φ, S has most reason to φ (perhaps on certain kind of grounds that are distinctive of morality). Does it follow that when S believes she morally ought to φ, she thereby believes of the possibility of (individual) rational amoralism. As he puts it, If rationalism is correct, a rational person can have a thought that something is right and yet remain unmoved, but only provided that she is not in a position to recognize the identity of rightness with the property of being rationally required. If she does or should recognize the identity then she also should rationally be motivated. (van Roojen 2010, 516-7)
To be sure, those who reject rational amoralism, such as Michael Smith, have a response open to them. Smith (1994) believes that for something to be what someone ought to do is for it to be the case that the subject's fully informed and maximally coherent counterparther ideal advisor -would want her to want to do it. Now, in the case of water and H 2 O, the property identity is famously a posteriori: it takes empirical investigation of the watery stuff around us to establish that water is necessarily H 2 O. But, Smith might respond to van Roojen, the identity of being the thing to do and being what one's ideal advisor would want one to want to do is a priori. It is an unobvious conceptual truth that is implicit in "the various inferential and quasi-inferential roles that such judgments have" (Smith 1997, 103) .
That is, when we look at the discriminations and inferences that competent users of moral (and more broadly normative) concepts are disposed to make, we can see that they form a pattern that is best explained by implicit belief in an ideal advisor's desires. So Smith can say either that everyone capable of thinking moral thoughts does in fact recognize that being the thing to do is being what one's ideal advisor would want one to want to do, or, more weakly, that every competent moral thinker is in a position to recognize the identity. Smith further argues that coherence requires one to desire as one believes one's ideal advisor would want one to desire, so that any agent who is rational in the narrow sense of having a disposition for coherence will desire to do what she believes she ought. If Smith's claims about content and rational motivation are true, then on both strong and weak readings of the implicit content of ought thoughts, moral thinkers are rationally required to be motivated by ought-thoughts -by van Roojen's own lights.
I do not, as a matter of fact, believe that normative claims have the content that Smith attributes to them. I think that instead of being beliefs about an ideal advisor's desires, they are beliefs about fittingness of attitudes, which in turn are implicitly beliefs about the attitudes of ideal subjects of various kinds (Kauppinen forthcoming b). And in work in progress, I offer a different explanation of why practical rationality requires desiring to act in ways one believes to be fittingly approved of or demanded from a moral point of view. But these differences matter less than the commonalities between Smith's view and mine. We both believe that fully competent subjects who have moral ought thoughts at least implicitly have thoughts with a content that rationalizes motivation.
So does it follow that practically rational agents are motivated in line with their moral beliefs? I don't think so. The issue turns on the relative transparency or opacity of rationalizing content. Smith assumes (and I agree) that the contents of beliefs are at least in part fixed by the inferential dispositions of the believer. Importantly, one may possess concept-relevant inferential dispositions to greater or smaller extent. For example, we can attribute sphericality-beliefs to someone who is disposed to draw only a few of the consequences of something being spherical. Among such dispositions may also be dispositions to defer to others in establishing the referent, as van Roojen (2010) emphasises in his argument. Consequently, people may possess a concept to only to a small degree, and do so parasitically on others who possess it to a higher degree -not every competent moral thinker is equally competent. I'll say that someone who has such a precarious grasp of a concept is only capable of opaque beliefs featuring it. It's not clear to her what she commits herself to in forming the belief. This is not itself irrational -for example, it is not irrational for me to think of some things that they are spherical, in spite of being disposed to draw only a few of the consequences of being spherical. It is a consequence of this picture of content that it may be possible for someone to have moral beliefs in spite of lacking the inferential and discriminatory dispositions that would license attributing belief in ideal advisors or subjects. For example, they may not be properly sensitive to demands of coherence in their desires. As long as their dispositions are close enough to those of fully competent moral thinkers, we can still attribute moral beliefs to them. But as long as such opaque moral beliefs do not implicitly refer to the attitudes of ideal advisors or subjects, the subjects need not be irrational if they fail to be motivated in accordance with their beliefs. If we are motivated in accordance with opaque moral beliefs, it will not be the result of the belief itself or the belief together with a disposition toward rationality. It may be because we're conscientious, desiring to do whatever is right, or desiring to have a nonderivative desire for whatever is right. But neither conscientious desire nor practical rationality is necessary for moral motivation: both opaque and transparent moral beliefs may be the result of a moral intuition, which will provide corresponding motivation. Indeed, there may be a kind of feedback loop: an occurrent belief might trigger the original intuition by association, and the intuition then provide a motivation act in accordance with the inert belief. 12 We get an even more complex -and in my view more realistic -picture, when we take into account the possibility that belief-based motivation of either transparent or opaque kind strengthens or clashes with intuition-based motivation. (For example, Huck Finn's desire to do the right thing might conflict with the intuition pulling in the other direction.)
Amoralists
As I said at the outset, many of us have the modal intuition that it is possible for someone to make a genuine moral judgment without having any relevant motivation -that is, amoralism is possible. The Disjunctivist account leaves room for different kinds of amoralist. Someone who has transparent moral beliefs and thus stands under a rational requirement to be guided by them may nevertheless be practically irrational and fail to be motivated. But there are also rational amoralists -those who have opaque moral beliefs and lack both the rationally optional conscientious desire and moral intuition. There could be any number of explanations for why a rational amoralist lacks a conscientious desire -listlessness, cynicism, and so on -and I have nothing to add to the existing stories. But thinking about the role of intuitions might help make further distinctions among the amoralists. It is probably true that some people are simply unable to have moral intuitions. Psychopaths might be a case in point, perhaps because of lacking empathy, which may be necessary to adopt the common point of view. 13 Nothing in my view calls into question the ability of psychopaths to form genuine moral beliefs, though they may have to defer to the testimony of others to acquire justification or even secure reference. The listless and even the cynics, however, might be only fleeting amoralists, even if their desires remain dead or hostile to morality. Moral intuitions, after all, are fundamentally non-voluntary. They might pop up all of a sudden to get even a cynic to perform a random act of kindness.
The Fetishism Argument
I've argued that externalism is true about moral judgments, which are only contingently, though non-accidentally, linked to motivation. Any kind of externalism faces an important challenge, Michael Smith's (1994 Smith's ( , 1996 justly famous Fetishism Argument. In this section, I'm going to argue that the Disjunctivist model captures modal intuitions about change in moral motivation and moral perfection well.
I will begin with a recap of the Smith's Argument. In what is perhaps the most careful formulation, Smith (1996) first defines a 'moralist' as anyone who is not an amoralist. Where an amoralist is motivationally indifferent to her judgments, a moralist is reliably motivated to φ if she judges she ought to φ, as long as she is practically rational.
(For the rest of this section, I'll take being practically rational as read, unless mentioned otherwise.) Internalists, of course, think that anyone who makes moral judgments is necessarily a moralist, while externalists believe that's a contingent matter. But, Smith notes, both will agree that it is a conceptual truth that if someone is a moralist and makes a moral judgment, she will be motivated accordingly. The debate then turns on which side can offer a better explanation of this conceptual truth, which Smith labels Weak Moralist Internalism.
For internalists, it is simply a consequence of the conceptual truth that anyone who makes a moral judgment will be motivated accordingly, unless practically irrational. If I judge that I ought to maximize happiness, I will be directly, non-instrumentally motivated to maximize believed that it is always right to maximize happiness and minimize suffering, and fundamentally so ... Over the years, however, via a process of argument, he came to change his mind. He now believes that it is sometimes right to give extra benefits to his family and friends, even when doing so cannot be given a utilitarian justification. He is also a moralist. His moral motivations have followed reliably in the wake of his new judgement, at least absent weakness of will. (Smith 1996, 180) According to Smith, the natural psychological description of what happened is that the friend first non-instrumentally wanted to maximize happiness, and then, "as a result of changing his moral beliefs" (ibid.), non-instrumentally wanted to give extra benefits to the near and the dear. This is just how a constitutional internalist sees it, since judgment that one ought to φ constitutes or, together with a disposition toward rationality, causes motivation to φ. The externalist, in contrast, must appeal to a Type I conscientious desire to do whatever is right in addition to the judgment itself. Combined with the belief that maximixing happiness is right, the conscientious desire gives rise to a derivative desire to maximize happiness. Once the rightness belief changes, the conscientious desire gives rise to a derivative desire to give extra benefits to the near and the dear. This, for Smith, is a "manifestly false and theorydriven redescription" of psychological change. (Notice that there's so far no talk about fetishism.)
Smith's second criticism is that externalism involves a "quite incredible picture of moral perfection" (Smith 1996, 181 acts have the moral standing that they have." (Smith 1996, 183 ) Such agents are not, in fact, morally perfect, but rather make doing the right thing into a kind of fetish.
Three Kinds of Moralist
I've given a fairly detailed account of the Fetishism Argument, since I believe it is often somewhat misconstrued in the literature. There are two points I want to emphasize. First, the intuitive datum is only the wide scope one: necessarily, if a moralist's judgment changes, her motivation changes accordingly. It isn't the narrow-scope one that change of judgment itself constitutes or causes motivation (in rational agents); that would be begging the question in favour of constitutional internalism. Second, there are indeed two challenges: avoiding both theory-driven redescription of psychological change and a fetishistic account of moral perfection. A satisfactory account of moral motivation must be address both simultaneously.
I do not have the space to properly discuss existing responses to Smith's argument, but it seems to me they fail on at least one of the counts. The responses divide into two classes. Some argue that Type I conscientious desires aren't fetishistic, and others defend an alternative to the Type I conscientious moralist. 14 The first line seems unpromising to mewhile it is easy to show that the desire to do whatever is right isn't always fetishistic, that's not sufficient to explain reliable motivational change across the board. The second line of response makes use of the wide scope of the intuitive datum. A number of explanations that appeal to other desires than the desire to do whatever is right have been proposed. For my money, the most promising of these appeal to a second-order desire to acquire a nonderivative ('de re') desire to do whatever is right (de dicto) (Copp 1997 , Dreier 2000 again, brings in its wake both change of judgment and change of motivation. Now Philip judges it right to privilege the well-being of family and friends and non-derivatively desires so. I don't think there's any reason to think this explanation of motivational change is any more theoretically motivated than the internalist's, when the case is filled in this way. The intuitive moralist's motivations and judgments both reliably follow her intuitions, so her motivation reliably changes when her judgments do.
The conscientious moralist, in turn, judges without intuition. In her case, motivation really does result from combining belief about duty with desire to do whatever one's duty is.
Let's say that a purely conscientious moralist is someone who has only opaque moral beliefs without ever having intuitions. Such a person might be an autist who is unable to take the perspective of others, and therefore unable to adopt the common point of view. amoralists, rational transparent moralists, intuitive moralists, and conscientious moralists. I think the most plausible answer is that the morally perfect are either rational transparent moralists (which gives us Smith's answer) or intuitive moralists. The latter feel negatively toward things that are genuinely wrong and positively toward things that really are morally right or obligatory, and their judgments are based on these sentiments, so they base their practical and theoretical reasoning on moral truths. And of course, given this, they noninstrumentally desire to do just the things they ought to do. For example, a morally perfect person has a negative sentiment toward failing to serve the well-being of her family and friends, and is motivated to serve the well-being of her family and friends. We can, if we like, describe this as her being moved by the well-being of her family and friends. It certainly isn't the case that she is moved by the rightness of serving the well-being of her family and friends. So there's no grounds for saying that a purely intuitive moralist is fetishistic, even though her motivation isn't provided directly by the judgment.
Once externalists distinguish among moralists this way, they can even grant that there is something defective about the purely conscientious moralist. By force of circumstance, she will only be motivated to do the right thing in a roundabout way, at least initially -of course, as others have pointed out, nothing rules out a conscientious moralist coming to have an intrinsic concern for what she regards obligatory (and if she is Type II, she will desire coming to have such concern). But that only means that not every moralist is equally perfect, which is a welcome result.
Conclusion: Varieties of Sentimentalism and Pluralism
I've argued that we can best understand the phenomena of moral motivation in terms of a Disjunctivist account, according to which internalism is true about intuitions, and beliefs are associated with motivation in a variety of ways. In this final section, I will briefly compare the Disjunctivist account with related views about moral motivation, and lay out some of its advantages.
There are, of course, many views for which emotions and attitudes play a key role in motivation. What non-cognitivist and hybrid expressivists like Gibbard (1990 ), Blackburn (1998 , and Ridge (2005) , on the one hand, and emotionist cognitivists like Prinz (2007) have in common is that they believe moral judgments are at least in part sentimental. As I've said, I reject this view, in part because it has trouble making sense of other psychological features of moral judgments and in part because it can't account for moral semantics. I believe that as far as moral psychology goes, the attraction of such views can be fully it is not surprising that even very competent speakers fail to heed the subtle distinctions. My hope is that this paper will make a small contribution to disentangling the issues.
